# GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia



**Public Safety Division** 

#### MEMORANDUM

- TO: **Richard Schmechel Executive Director** D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission
- FROM: Dave Rosenthal Senior Assistant Attorney General
- DATE: July 17, 2017
- Comments to D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission First Draft of Report No. SUBJECT: 6, Recommendations for Chapter 8 of the Revised Criminal Code – Penalty Enhancements

The Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia (OAG) and the other members of the Code Revision Advisory Group of the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission (CCRC) were asked to review the Commission's First Draft of Report No. 6, Recommendations for Chapter 8 of the Revised Criminal Code – Penalty Enhancements (the Report). OAG reviewed this document and makes the recommendations noted below.<sup>1</sup>

# **COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

### § 22A-805, Limitations on Penalty Enhancements

Section 22A-805 (a) uses the word "equivalent" but does not define it. Because it is defined in a later section the use of the word here is confusing, if not misleading.

Section 22A-805 (a) states:

PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS NOT APPLICABLE TO OFFENSES WITH EQUIVALENT ELEMENTS. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an offense is not subject to a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This review was conducted under the understanding that the structure of the code revision process allows the members of the Code Revision Advisory Group an opportunity to provide meaningful input without limiting the position that the members may take at any subsequent hearing that the Council may have on any legislation that may result from the Report.

penalty enhancement in this Chapter when that offense contains an element in one of its gradations which is equivalent to the penalty enhancement.

In giving definitions to undefined Code terms the Court of Appeals has looked to definitions found in Code provisions that were enacted at a different time for a different purpose. See *Nixon v. United States*, 730 A.2d 145 (D.C. 1999), where the Court applied the definition of "serious bodily injury" found in a sex offense statute to the offense of aggravated assault. Because the very next section after § 22A-805 contains a definition for the word "equivalent" it is possible that, notwithstanding the limiting language in § 22A-806  $(f)(2)^2$ , the Court of Appeals may look to that enacted definition when determining the meaning of the earlier use of the word "equivalent" in § 22A-805 (a). Clearly this is not what the Commission intends. To avoid any confusion about what the word means, to avoid making the Court of Appeals define the term, and to avoid unnecessary litigation, OAG suggests that the word "equivalent" be defined in § 22A-805 (a), a different word be used in § 22A-805 (a), or a definition be drafted that can be used in both sections.

Section 22A-805 (a) also uses the word "gradations." This word is also not defined. OAG suggests that the sentence be rewritten so that the word "gradations" is replaced by a term that includes "lesser included offenses."<sup>3</sup>

On page 4 of the Report there is a discussion of the holding in *Bigelow v. United States*, 498 A.2d 210 (D.C. 1985), and its application after the enactment of § 22A-805. The discussion initially leads the reader to believe that multiple repeat offender provisions would continue to apply when the dictates of *Lagon v. United States*, 442 A.2d 166, 169 (D.C. 1982), have been met. The paragraph then concludes with the statement "However, insofar as RCC § 22A-805 is intended to reduce unnecessary overlap in statutes, courts may construe the term "equivalent" in RCC § 22A-805 more broadly than under current law." It is OAG's position that this determination not be left to the courts to resolve. Rather, the Commission should unequivocally state that the holding in *Bigelow* would apply after enactment of these provisions.

### § 22A-806, Repeat Offender Penalty Enhancements

On page 8 of the Report the term "Prior Convictions" is defined. Section 22A-806 (f)(5)(i) states, "Convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion or during the same course of conduct shall be counted as only one conviction..." However, the proposed language does not clarify what is meant by the word "occasion." Unfortunately, the addition of the phrase "during the same course of conduct" does not clarify it. Take, for example, the following scenario. An in-home worker who visits an elderly patient once a week is convicted for stealing from the victim. Afterwards, the government learns that the in-home worker actually started working for the patient at an earlier time and also stole from the patient during that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Section 22A-806 (f)(2) states "For the purposes of this section, 'equivalent' means a criminal offense with elements that would necessarily prove the elements of the District criminal offense."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For example, § 22A-805 (a) could be rewritten to say "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an offense is not subject to a penalty enhancement in this Chapter when that offense contains an <u>or any of its lesser included offenses contains an</u> element in one of its gradations which is equivalent to the penalty enhancement."

previous time period. Would a second conviction of the in-home worker be the subject of an enhancement under § 22A-806 (f)(5)(i) or would it be considered "the same course of conduct"? Either the proposed code provision or the Commentary should address this issue. To the extent that there is current case law on this issue, it should be fleshed out in the Commentary.

In § 22A-806 (f)(5)(iv) it states "A conviction for which a person has been pardoned shall not be counted as a conviction. OAG suggests that this exception be expanded to include convictions that have been sealed by a court on grounds of actual innocence.

### § 22A-807, Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement

On page 17 of the Report the Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement is explained. Section 22A-807 (a) states:

A hate crime penalty enhancement applies to an offense when the offender commits the offense with intent to <u>injure or intimidate another person</u> because of prejudice against that person's perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibility, homelessness, physical disability, matriculation, or political affiliation. [Emphasis added]

Though not expounded upon in the Commentary, this penalty enhancement has narrower application than the current bias-related crime penalty. The definition of a "Designated act" in D.C. Code § 22-3701 includes not only injury to another person but property crimes as well. So long as the act is based upon prejudice, a bias-related crime penalty can currently be given when a defendant is guilty of injuring property, theft, and unlawful entry. See § 22-3701 (2). The Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement should be expanded to cover all of the offenses currently included under the law.

# § 22A-808, Pretrial Release Penalty Enhancement

On page 24 of the Report there are definitions for the misdemeanor, felony, and crime of violence pretrial release penalty enhancements. To be consistent with the wording of § 22A-806 (a), (b), and (c) two changes should be made to these provisions. First, the term "in fact" should be added to each of the pretrial release penalty enhancements. For example, § 22A-808 (a) should be redrafted to say "A misdemeanor pretrial release penalty enhancement applies to a misdemeanor when the offender, *in fact*, committed the misdemeanor while on release pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-1321 for another offense." [Additional term italicized] Second, penalty enhancements found in § 22A-806 refer to "the defendant" whereas the penalty enhancements found in § 22A-808 refer to "the offender." To avoid arguments about whether the difference in wording has legal significance, the same term should be used in both sections.

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PUBLIC DEFENDER	To:	Richard Schmechel, Executive Director D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission
SERVICE for the District of Columbia	From:	Laura E. Hankins, General Counsel
for the District of Columbia	Date:	July 18, 2017
CHAMPIONS OF LIBERTY	Re:	Comments on First Draft of Report No. 6: Recommendations for Chapter 8 of the Revised Criminal Code: Penalty Enhancements

PDS has the following concerns and makes the following suggestions:

1. With respect to RCC § 22A-806, Repeat Offender Penalty Enhancements, PDS recommends the complete elimination of this section. Repeat offender penalty enhancements represent a triple counting of criminal conduct and work a grave miscarriage of justice for individuals who have already paid their debt to society in the form of a prior sentence. Repeat offender penalty enhancements exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal justice system and increase sentences that are already too long.

The United States incarcerates more people than any other country in the world. The last forty years have seen relentless growth in incarceration.<sup>1</sup> The expansion in prison population is driven by greater numbers of people entering the system, less diversion, and longer sentences.<sup>2</sup> Enhancements create even longer sentences – beyond what the legislature originally envisioned for a particular offense committed by a broad range of potential culpable actors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Sentencing Project, Ending Mass Incarceration: Charting a New Justice Investment, available at: http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/ending-mass-incarceration-charting-a-new-justice-reinvestment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> James Forman, Jr., *Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow*, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21, 48 (2012).

The commentary to the Revised Criminal Code ("RCC") justifies, in part, the continued use of prior convictions to enhance criminal sentences on the lack of evidence on how the operation of criminal history in sentencing may affect racial disparities.<sup>3</sup> But evidence of the criminal justice system's disparate impact on African-Americans abounds. The Black-white "disparity-ratio" in male imprisonment rates was nearly 6:1 in 2014.<sup>4</sup> Hispanic-white ratios for males were 2.3:1.<sup>5</sup> In the District, nearly fifty percent of black males between the ages of 18-35 were under criminal justice supervision according to a study by the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives.<sup>6</sup> The Sentencing Commission's statement that "the number of non-black, felony offenders present too small a sample size for meaningful statistical analysis" tells the picture of who in fact is being sentenced on felony offenses.<sup>7</sup> While enhancements may not necessarily cause disparity in sentencing, the use of penalty enhancements has the effect of amplifying racial disparities already present in the criminal justice system.

For instance, consider the evidence of disparate prosecution for drug offenses. Although blacks and whites use drugs at roughly the same rates, African Americans are significantly more likely to be arrested and imprisoned for drug offenses.<sup>8</sup> "Black arrest rates are so much higher than white rates because police choose as a strategic matter to invest more energy and effort in arresting blacks. So many more blacks than whites are in prison because police officials have adopted practices, and policy makers have enacted laws, that foreseeably treat black offenders much more harshly than white ones."<sup>9</sup> Sentencing enhancements for multiple prior misdemeanor or felony drug offenses create a feedback effect that amplifies the existing bias, or choices, already made by the criminal justice system.

PDS is not arguing that consideration of prior convictions should have no place in our criminal justice system, but rather that the place these prior convictions hold is already sufficient. As noted in the commentary, a defendant's criminal history is a dominant feature in the Sentencing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Commentary for RCC§ 22A-806 at 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2014 (2015), available at: https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf; see also, The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Eric R. Lotke, "*Hobbling a Generation*," National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, August 1997.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Commentary for RCC§ 22A-806 at 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Tonry, M., & Melewski, M. (2008), *The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control Policy on Black Americans*. In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and justice: A review of research (pp. 1-44). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; James Forman, Jr., *Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow*, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21, 48 (2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Id.

Guidelines.<sup>10</sup> A prior felony conviction will often mean that probation is excluded as a guidelines-compliant sentencing option. Because it will move a defendant to a higher column on the guidelines grid, a prior felony conviction will also mean that the corresponding guidelines-compliant prison sentence the defendant will face is longer. This is important because judges overwhelmingly comply with the Sentencing Guidelines and thus already abide by a system that heavily weighs prior criminal history.<sup>11</sup> In addition to being determinative of which box a defendant will fall into on the Sentencing Guidelines, prior criminal history must be considered in sentencing the defendant within that box. This is the case because the D.C. Code explicitly requires judges to "impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense and the criminal history of the offender."<sup>12</sup> Enhancements therefore create a system that triple counts prior convictions for individuals who have already faced consequences as a direct result of the prior conviction.

While misdemeanors are not covered by the Sentencing Guidelines or by D.C. Code § 24-403.01, there is no doubt that judges consider criminal history in deciding whether to impose incarceration and in deciding the amount of incarceration to impose. Prosecutors routinely argue for a sentencing result based in substantial part on the defendant's criminal history. Penalty enhancements for misdemeanors create the same issue of over-counting criminal history for offenses where the defendant has already paid a debt to society. Further, as acknowledged in the commentary, misdemeanor enhancements exist in a tiny minority of jurisdictions. According to the commentary, only Maine, Missouri, and New Hampshire allow enhancements for prior misdemeanor convictions.<sup>13</sup>

There is no evidence that longer sentences for defendants who have committed multiple misdemeanors produce meaningful long-term improvements in community safety or better individual outcomes. To the contrary, many misdemeanor offenses can be addressed through comprehensive community based programming rather than ever longer periods of incarceration. For example, repeated drug possession offenses or offenses that stem from drug addiction such as theft may be successfully addressed through referrals to drug treatment. <sup>14</sup> Current Superior Court policies establishing specialized courts for individuals with mental illness or issues with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Commentary for RCC§ 22A-806 at 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines Manual (June 27, 2016) at 1. The 2015 annual report for the District of Columbia Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision Commission lists compliance as "very high" and "consistently above 90% since 2011" and 96% in 2015. Available at: https://scdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/scdc/publication/attachments/Annual% 20Report% 202 015% 20Website% 205-2-16.pdf .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> D.C. Code § 24-403.01(a)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Commentary for RCC§ 22A-806 at 13 fn. 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Justice Policy Institute, Substance Abuse Treatment and Public Safety January 2008 available at: http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/08\_01\_rep\_drugtx\_ac-ps.pdf.

drug addiction reflect the community sentiment that there are better solutions to crime than more incarceration.

While the RCC does not propose specific mandatory minimums for enhancements, it contemplates a structure that would force a judge to sentence a defendant to a mandatory minimum once the prosecution proves the applicability of a repeat offender enhancement.<sup>15</sup> PDS opposes the use of mandatory minimums in the RCC. PDS believes that judges should be trusted to exercise discretion in sentencing defendants. Judges are in the best position to review the facts in each case and the unique history of each defendant. Judges make decisions informed by a presentence report, statements of victims, the community, and sometimes medical professionals. Judges should be trusted to weigh the equities in each case and impose, consistent with the law, a fair sentence.

2. With respect to RCC § 22A-807, Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement, PDS appreciates that the causal nexus between the crime and the bias is clarified in RCC § 22A-807. However, PDS has concerns about several of the broad categories of bias listed in the RCC. As acknowledged in the commentary for RCC § 22A-807, the list of protected categories is broader than other jurisdictions and includes several characteristics many states do not recognize, such as personal appearance, matriculation, marital status, and family responsibility.<sup>16</sup> PDS believes that it is appropriate to include these categories in the District's human rights law which prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodation, and education.<sup>17</sup> However, when used in the criminal code, these categories may allow for prosecution outside of the intended scope of the hate crime statute. For instance, by including marital status and family responsibility, a defendant who kills an ex-husband because of a bitter divorce or because the exhusband fails to take on family responsibility may be subject to a hate crime enhancement. A teenager who commits a robbery motivated by anger at a complainant's flashy personal appearance could similarly be subject to a hate crime enhancement.<sup>18</sup> This expansion of the hate crime categories would allow for a sentencing enhancement to apply to what the legislature likely envisioned to be within the standard range of motives for the commission of an offense. Thus, PDS recommends removing the following categories from proposed §22A-807: marital status, personal appearance, family responsibility, and matriculation.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The RCC § 22A-806(e) provides for at least the possibility of mandatory minimum sentences for the commission of repeat offenses. PDS understands that sentencing will be fully considered by the Commission at a later time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Commentary for RCC§ 22A-806 at 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> D.C. Code § 2-1402.01-§2-1402.41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> PDS does not disagree with treating as a hate crime a crime committed because of a prejudice against a person's appearance or dress that is or appears to be different than the person's gender but believes that bias is covered by the "gender identity or expression" term in §22A-807.

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In general, the Public Defender Service approves the recommendations in the First Draft of Report No. 7. PDS has the following concerns, however, and makes the following suggestions:

- The Commentary refers to two cases with the name "Jones v. United States": (Richard C.) Jones v. United States, 124 A.3d 127 (D.C. 2015), cited on pages 7 and 10; and (John W.) Jones v. United States, 386 A.2d 308 (D.C. 1978), cited on pages 13-14 and 18. We suggest that the defendants' first names be added to these citations to make it easier to distinguish between the two cases.
- 2. We suggest omitting two hypothetical examples from Footnotes 2 and 8 of the Commentary to avoid unnecessary confusion about the scope and application of attempt.

• The last sentence of Footnote 2, on page 4, poses the following hypothetical: "For example, to determine whether a person arrested by police just prior to pulling a firearm out of his waistband acted with the intent to kill a nearby victim entails a determination that the person planned to retrieve the firearm, aim it at the victim, and pull the trigger."

As written, this example suggests that a defendant could be convicted of attempted assault with intent to kill where he had not yet pulled a firearm out of his waistband. We believe that this conduct, without more, would be insufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted assault with intent to kill. Moreover, the example raises complex questions that this group has yet to resolve concerning the interplay between attempt and gradations of assault offenses. We therefore propose that the footnote be deleted to avert the risk that readers will draw incorrect inferences about sufficiency.

• Footnote 8, on page 5, includes among its examples of incomplete attempts "the attempted felony assault prosecution of a person who suffers a debilitating heart attack just as he or she is

about to exit a vehicle and repeatedly beat the intended victim." We believe that these facts, without more, provide an insufficient basis for an attempted felony assault conviction. This hypothetical likewise raises questions about the type of proof necessary to establish an attempted felony assault, where felony assault requires a specific degree of harm. We propose that the hypothetical be deleted.

3. PDS proposes modifying § 22A-301(a)(3) to read as follows (alterations are underlined):

(3) The person<u>'s conduct</u> is either:

(A) <u>Reasonably adapted to and</u> dangerously close to <u>the accomplishment of</u> that offense; or

(B) Would be dangerously close to <u>the accomplishment of</u> that offense if the situation was as the person perceived it, provided that the person's conduct is reasonably adapted to <u>the accomplishment of</u> that offense.

First, we suggest changing the subject of (a)(3) from "the person" to "the person's conduct," to make more explicit that the jury's focus should be on the conduct of the defendant.

Second, PDS proposes modifying subsection (A) to insert the phrase "reasonably adapted to" before the phrase "dangerously close," to make clear that the requirement of conduct "reasonably adapted" to completion of the target offense applies to *all* attempt charges, and not only those that fall under subsection (B). This alteration would comport with case law from the D.C. Court of Appeals, which has held that "[1]he government must establish conduct by the defendant that is reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of the crime . . .." *Seeney v. United States*, 563 A.2d 1061, 1083 (D.C. 1989); *see also Williams v. United States*, 966 A.2d 844, 848 (D.C. 2009); *(John W.) Jones v. United States*, 386 A.2d 308, 312 (D.C. 1978). The current draft, which uses the "reasonably adapted" language only in subsection (B), creates the impression—at odds with case law—that this requirement does not exist for attempts that fall under subsection (A), and could lead the jury to conclude that the conduct requirements under subsection (A) are looser than under subsection (B). This alteration would also align the draft provision with the current Red Book instruction, which reflects current District law in this area and which requires proof that the defendant "did an act reasonably adapted to accomplishing the crime." Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 7.101, Attempt (5th ed. rel. 14).

Inclusion of the "reasonably adapted" language in subsection (A) would have the additional benefit of giving some substance to the "dangerously close" requirement and ensuring that innocent conduct is not punished as an attempt. PDS supports the draft's adherence to the "dangerously close" standard for conduct, which reflects current case law. The term "dangerously close," however, is not defined. Consistent use of the "reasonably adapted" language in both (A) and (B) would help to establish a clearer limitation on the conduct that can give rise to an attempt conviction. We believe that clear and exacting conduct standards are essential in the context of attempt, because the defendant's thoughts and plans play such a critical role in the question of guilt, but must often be inferred from a defendant's actions.

Third, we suggest modifying both (A) and (B) to replace the phrases "committing that offense" and "commission of that offense" with the phrase "the accomplishment of that offense." Like the

phrase "reasonably adapted," the "accomplishment" language appears in both the current Redbook instruction on Attempt and DCCA case law. *See, e.g., Seeney*, 563 A.2d at 1083; *Williams*, 966 A.2d at 848. Maintaining that terminology in the statutory provision would thus provide continuity and consistency. It would also avert confusion about the point at which the target offense has been "committed." Just as the "dangerously close" standard requires the jury to focus on the defendant's proximity to completing the target offense, rather than his preparatory actions, the "accomplishment" language keeps the jury's focus on the completion of the target crime.

# Comments of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia on D.C. Criminal Code Commission Recommendations

# for Chapter 3 of the Revised Criminal Code: Definition of a Criminal Attempt (First Draft of Report No. 7)

# and for Chapter 8 of the Revised Criminal Code: Penalty Enhancements (First Draft of Report No. 6)

### Submitted July 21, 2017

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia maintains the positions it previously has articulated in its correspondence on December 18, 2014, to the former D.C. Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision Commission, and on June 16, 2016, to Kenyan McDuffie (then chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary & Public Safety of the District of Columbia Council). In response to the request of the District of Columbia Criminal Code Reform Commission, we provide the following preliminary comments on these materials provided for Advisory Group review:

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHAPTER 3 OF THE REVISED CRIMINAL CODE (DEFINITION OF A CRIMINAL ATTEMPT) First Draft of Report No. 7

- Section 22A-301(a): Definition of Attempt COMMENTARY
  - Page 3: tenant  $\rightarrow$  tenet
  - Pages 5 (text accompanying footnotes 8 and 9), 14-15, 37: Advisory Group should discuss further whether the DCCA sees a meaningful distinction between the "dangerous proximity" and "substantial step" tests, considering *Hailstock*

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHAPTER 8 OF THE REVISED CRIMINAL CODE (PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS) First Draft of Report No. 6

- Section 22A-805: Limitations on Penalty Enhancements COMMENTARY
  - Page 4: USAO-DC agrees that subsections (b) and (c) "codify procedural requirements for penalty enhancements . . . required in *Apprendi* . . . and subsequent case law."
- Section 22A-807: Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement (at page 17)
  - Section title: Labeling it a "hate" crime is a change from current law, which refers to this as a "bias-related crime."
  - o (c) Definitions: (iii)-(v) should be subheadings within (ii)