


MEMORANDUM



To: Richard Schmechel, Executive Director
D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission

From: Laura E. Hankins

Date: September 11, 2018

Re: Comments on First Draft of Report No. 23,
Disorderly Conduct and Public Nuisance

PDS has the following comments about the RCC disorderly conduct and public nuisance offenses.

1. PDS recommends that both disorderly conduct¹ and public nuisance² have a third element: “[and] the person knowingly fails to obey a law enforcement officer’s order that the person cease engaging in the conduct.”

The public order and safety benefit of a crime such as disorderly conduct is that it can allow for law enforcement intervention at a low level of harm (or disorder), before the conduct has a chance to escalate into more serious criminal conduct or provoke a criminal response by a third party. The challenge of criminalizing low-level conduct is that it increases the opportunities for negative contacts with law enforcement particularly in communities that many view as over-policed.³ PDS agrees with the general approach the Commission takes with respect to disorderly conduct and public nuisance but thinks ultimately the Commission’s proposal still allows too much room for over-policing and over-criminalizing the lives of marginalized persons. For example, RCC § 22A-4001 requires that the “apparent danger of bodily injury ... must be unlawful, such as assaultive conduct.”⁴ “Horseplay” and other legal group activities would not, according to the Commentary, be disorderly conduct unless the conduct created a likelihood of

¹ RCC § 22A-4001.

² RCC § 22A-4002.

³ As the D.C. Council Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary explained “[t]he disorderly conduct [offense] is clearly important to quality of life as well as the public peace” while also noting that the D.C. Office of Police Complaints’ detailed 2003 report on arrests for disorderly conduct “not surprisingly” included a finding that the disorderly conduct statutes were subject to abuse by arresting officers. See Council of the District of Columbia Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary Report on Bill 18-425, the Disorderly Conduct Amendment Act of 2010, at pages 2-3.

⁴ Report #23, page 4.

immediate bodily injury to someone not participating in the legal group activity.⁵ However, the offense does not actually require that the conduct be unlawful. The crime is recklessly causing another to *reasonably believe* that the conduct is unlawful. While horseplay might be lawful, if the “horseplayers” are aware of a substantial risk that someone observing them will “reasonably believe” that their (lawful) conduct is in fact unlawful, then the “horseplayers” would be guilty of committing “disorderly conduct.” Layer into this the widely accepted notion that certain behavior is often viewed as being “violent” when committed by African-Americans and recognizing that African-Americans are well aware that their innocent conduct creates a “substantial risk” that it will be viewed “reasonably” (as in, a belief commonly held by a majority of persons) as unlawful and potentially injurious to others or their property⁶ and it is clear that, despite its best efforts to construct clear and narrow boundaries around this offense, the Commission left the back door unlocked, if not open.

That said, PDS also strongly supports intervention and defusing of situations while they are at a low-level rather than waiting until more serious offenses are committed. Adding an element that the person must fail to obey a law enforcement order that she cease engaging in the conduct creates a better balance between the desirable goals of a disorderly conduct statute to keep the peace and the risks of police abuse and over-criminalization. It allows, actually requires, law enforcement interaction – the order to cease – which will usually be sufficient to defuse a potentially unlawful situation or to establish that the conduct is lawful.⁷ Plus, it provides an additional safeguard for the individual before she is subject to arrest and prosecution.

2. PDS recommends eliminating “taking of property” as a means of committing disorderly conduct.” The basic offenses of assault (unlawful bodily injury to another person) and “[criminal] damage to property” only require “recklessly” as a mental state.⁸ Theft, however, requires *knowingly* taking the property of another.⁹ *Recklessly* engaging in behavior that causes another to reasonably believe there is likely to be an immediate [*reckless*] bodily injury to another or that there is likely to be immediate [*reckless*] damage to property makes sense and is plausible. In contrast, disorderly conduct (taking property) would require that a person

⁵ Id.

⁶ See e.g., driving while Black, walking while Black, swimming while Black, selling water while Black, sleeping while Black, barbecuing while Black, waiting for the subway while Black, playing with a toy in a public park while Black, being in one’s own backyard while Black, being in one’s own apartment located above a police officer’s apartment while Black, etc., etc., etc.

⁷ If the law enforcement interaction establishes that the conduct is lawful – e.g., the people involved explain they are actually playing rugby – then the law enforcement official will have no basis on which to order the conduct to cease. The officer’s interaction will have established that it would be *unreasonable* to believe there is likely to be immediate and unlawful bodily injury to another person except, exactly at the Commentary explains, in situations where the conduct creates a likelihood of immediate bodily injury to a third party, a person not engaged consensually in the lawful group activity.

⁸ See RCC § 22A-1202(f); §22A-2503(a).

⁹ See RCC § 22A-2101(a).

recklessly engage in conduct that causes another to *reasonably* believe there is likely to be the immediate *knowing* taking of property. Conduct that is “dangerously close” to taking property should be prosecuted as attempt theft. As currently drafted, disorderly conduct (taking of property) either overlaps with attempt theft or criminalizes conduct that is *less than* “dangerously close” to theft. Including “taking of property” as a means to commit disorderly conduct weakens the offenses of theft and attempt theft; there is no point in requiring the knowing taking of property if one can be prosecuted for recklessly making someone believe property will be (knowingly) taken. PDS is concerned, assuming there even is reckless conduct that could create a reasonable belief about a knowing result, that the conduct would necessarily be very minor and ambiguous; so minor and ambiguous that to arrest and prosecute someone for it would be arbitrary and unjust.

3. PDS recommends that both disorderly conduct and public nuisance be jury demandable, regardless of the penalty attached. Because of the First Amendment implications of both offenses as well as the tension they create between preserving public order and over-policing/police abuse, the accountability that a jury provides is critical.
4. PDS recommends rewriting the definition of “lawful public gathering” in the public nuisance offense to narrow its reach.¹⁰ The definition does not require that the gathering itself be public, so it would seem to be unlawful to intentionally interrupt a private gathering. The breadth and vagueness of the catch-all language, “similar organized proceeding,” only reinforces the sweep of this provision. Are weddings “lawful public gatherings”? Is a high school graduation ceremony a “lawful public gathering?” PDS finds this means of committing the public nuisance offense troubling but would consent to a definition that is narrow and specific to funerals, that uses the word “means” instead of “includes,” and that does not include any catch-all language.
5. PDS objects to the definition of “public building” in the public nuisance offense.¹¹ Although according to the Commentary, subsection (c)(4) is to “clarif[y] that a public building is a building that is occupied by the District of Columbia or federal government” and therefore is not meant to “apply to efforts to dissuade customers from patronizing a privately-owned business,”¹² the definition, by focusing on the physical building and by using the very general term “government”, does not address situations where privately-owned business are co-located in buildings with any D.C. or federal government agency. The Commission clarified at its August 1 public meeting that subsection (c)(4) is “intended to prohibit purposeful (and not incidental) interruptions of [D.C.] Council hearings and similar proceedings, whether they occur at [the Wilson Building] or at an offsite location.”¹³ PDS recommends rewriting the definition of “public building” to more clearly convey that narrower intent.


¹⁰ See RCC § 22A-4002(c)(4).

¹¹ See RCC § 22A-4002(c)(5).

¹² Report # 23, page 13.

¹³ Minutes of Public Meeting, D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission, August 1, 2018, page 4.

MEMORANDUM



To: Richard Schmechel, Executive Director
D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission

From: Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia

Date: September 11, 2018

Re: Comments on First Draft of Report No. 24,
Failure to Disperse and Rioting

PDS has the following comments about the RCC offenses of failure to disperse and rioting.

1. As reflected in the minutes of the CCRC meeting of August 1, 2018, PDS raised a concern about liability for failure to disperse where the individual does not know that a law enforcement officer has determined that her presence is substantially impairing the law enforcement officer's ability to stop a course of disorderly conduct. At the August 1, 2018 meeting staff clarified that a person must know that she is being ordered to disperse. Staff further noted that the person must be in the immediate vicinity of the course of disorderly conduct and that the officer's assessment about the need for the order to disperse must be objectively accurate. PDS requests that this clarification by staff be included in the commentary of RCC § 22A-4102.
2. RCC § 22A-4101 defines rioting, in part, as the commission of disorderly conduct when the defendant is "reckless" as to the fact that four or more people in the immediate vicinity are simultaneously engaging in disorderly conduct. PDS recommends that the CCRC substitute the mental state of recklessness with knowledge. Requiring that the defendant know that individuals in his immediate vicinity are engaging in disorderly conduct is appropriate given First Amendment concerns about rioting statutes. In the District, it is not uncommon for protests to involve thousands of people or even tens of thousands of people. Under these circumstances, during a mass protest, it may always be the case that a protester is aware of a substantial risk that others are engaging in disorderly conduct and that the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe is to remove himself from the protest.¹ Using a standard of recklessness would over-criminalize potentially constitutionally protected conduct. Just as the CCRC requires knowledge that a participant in the disorderly conduct is using or plans to use a weapon, the CCRC should require actual knowledge that others in the immediate vicinity are engaged in disorderly conduct.

¹ RCC § 22A-205.

3. PDS recommends eliminating “taking of property” as a means of committing rioting. Under the current RCC definition, an individual commits the offense of rioting when he commits disorderly conduct, reckless as to the participation of four or more people and when the conduct is committed with the intent to facilitate the commission of a crime involving bodily injury to another, damage to property of another, or the taking of property of another. Including taking of property within rioting has the potential of creating unnecessary overlap with the offenses of robbery and theft committed by codefendants. For example, under the current RCC definition of rioting, almost any robbery committed by four or more juveniles could also be charged as rioting. If the CCRC’s inclusion of conduct “involving the taking of property of another” is intended to address crimes such as looting by multiple individuals, that conduct would already be covered by the inclusion of conduct “involving damage to the property of another.” There are few instances when a group of four or more people could commit disorderly conduct and take property of another without also causing damage to property. Removing “the taking of property of another” from the definition would not cause any gaps in liability and would prevent overlap with property crimes committed by codefendants.
4. RCC § 22A-4101(3)(B) defines rioting as criminal conduct committed while “knowingly possessing a dangerous weapon.” PDS recommends that this language be amended to “knowingly using or displaying a dangerous weapon.” This amendment would mirror section (C) of rioting which establishes liability when the defendant “know[s] any participant in the disorderly conduct is using or plans to use a dangerous weapon.”

The possession of a dangerous weapon², such as false knuckles³ or a knife with a blade over three inches in length, in a pocket, purse, or backpack while committing the offense of disorderly conduct does not increase danger to the community or elevate the fear experienced by bystanders. The possession of a dangerous weapon in a backpack would not be apparent to community members until the weapon is later recovered during a search incident to arrest. In such instances, where the weapon is not used or displayed, the possession of a weapon would be entirely ancillary to the offense of rioting.

The possession of a dangerous weapon in a backpack, purse, or pocket would also be separately punishable as a stand-alone count of weapon possession. To decrease unnecessary overlap, the RCC should limit liability in rioting to occasions when the defendant knowing uses or displays a dangerous weapon.

² RCC § 22A-1001 (dangerous weapon defined).

³ § 22A-1001(14) (prohibited weapon defined).

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia

Public Safety Division



MEMORANDUM

TO: Richard Schmechel
Executive Director
D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission

FROM: Dave Rosenthal
Senior Assistant Attorney General

DATE: September 14, 2018

SUBJECT: First Draft of Report #23, Disorderly Conduct and Public Nuisance

The Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia (OAG) and the other members of the Code Revision Advisory Group of the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission (CCRC) were asked to review the First Draft of Report #23 - Disorderly Conduct and Public Nuisance.¹

COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

RCC § 22A-4001. Disorderly Conduct.

The proposed disorderly conduct statute varies from the current law in many ways. It appears to legalize a certain type of dangerous behavior. As the Comment section notes on page 4, to be disorderly conduct under the proposal, “The apparent danger of bodily injury must be to another person; a person cannot commit disorderly conduct where she poses a risk of harm to only herself.” While we do not disagree with footnote 6 that “a person who is performing a dangerous skateboarding stunt, high wire act, or magic trick in a public square” should not be guilty of this offense, we disagree that “She has not committed disorderly conduct unless it appears likely that her conduct will cause bodily injury to someone other than herself or damage to property.” D.C. Code § 22-1321(a)(3) currently makes it unlawful for a person to “Direct abusive or offensive language or gestures at another person (other than a law enforcement officer while acting in his or her official capacity) in a manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation or violence

¹ This review was conducted under the understanding that the structure of the code revision process allows the members of the Code Revision Advisory Group an opportunity to provide meaningful input without limiting the position that the members may take at any subsequent hearing that the Council may have on any legislation that may result from the Report.

by that person or another person.” So, under current law, a person can commit disorderly conduct where she poses a risk of harm only to herself.

RCC § 22A-4001² would exempt police from being the target of all disorderly conduct offenses. Current law only exempts them from being the target of “Direct abusive or offensive language or gestures at another person ... in a manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation or violence by that person or another person.” This was because the Council acknowledged the special training that police should have. It does not exempt them from being the victim of “Intentionally or recklessly act in such a manner as to cause another person to be in reasonable fear that a person or property in a person’s immediate possession is likely to be harmed or taken” or “Incite or provoke violence where there is a likelihood that such violence will ensue” e.g. It would be disorderly conduct for a person to incite a mob to hurt a police officer by chanting, “stone the cop, kill the cop” when there were rocks nearby.

As to the current state of the law concerning the exemption of police from being the target for disorderly conduct offenses, OAG disagrees with the conclusion in the Relation to Current District Law portion of the Commentary that the proposal would merely clarify existing law. On page 7 the report says D.C. Code § 22-1321 (a)(1) and (a)(2) are “silent as to whether they cover conduct directed at law enforcement officers and no District case law addresses this issue.” True, (a)(1) and (a)(2) do not specifically reference law enforcement officers, but their plain terms unequivocally cover them, just as they unequivocally reach other groups that aren’t specifically mentioned (e.g., tourists). Paragraph (a)(1) is satisfied by reasonable fear to “another person,” which logically includes law enforcement officers. And (a)(2) refers to incitement of provocation of violence, without regard to the identity of the potential victim. It is only (a)(3), dealing with abusive or offensive language or gestures, that carves out police officers – which is no more than what the legislative history the report cites says. On page 8 of the Committee Report it states, in relevant part, the following:

Subsection (a) proscribes breach of the peace; it prohibits conduct and language (e.g., fighting words) that is likely to provoke an outbreak of violence (e.g., a

² The offense portion of RCC § 22A-4001 is as follows:

- (a) A person commits disorderly conduct when that person:
 - (1) Recklessly engages in conduct that:
 - (A) Causes another person to reasonably believe that there is likely to be immediate and unlawful:
 - (i) Bodily injury to another person;
 - (ii) Damage to property; or
 - (iii) Taking of property; and
 - (B) Is not directed at a law enforcement officer in the course of his or her official duties;
 - (2) While that person is in a location that, in fact, is:
 - (A) Open to the general public; or
 - (B) A communal area of multi-unit housing.

fight) ... The Committee Print rejects language proposed by OAG/MPD/USAO for paragraph (3) of this subsection because it would undercut an important purpose of the language: that the crime of using abusive or offensive language must focus on the likelihood of provoking a violent reaction by persons other than a police officer to whom the words were directed, because a police officer is expected to have a greater tolerance for verbal assaults and is especially trained to resist provocation by verbal abuse that might provoke or offend the ordinary citizen. (See *Shepherd v. District of Columbia*, 929 A.2d 417,419 (D.C. 2007)). The law should have a bright line: that offensive language directed at police officers is not disorderly conduct. Further, it seems unlikely at best that the use of bad language toward a police officer will provoke immediate retaliation or violence, not by him, but by someone else (see *Comments of the OAG, MPD, and USAO* attached to this report). [emphasis added]³

When the Council enacted the legislation it created that bright line in the part of the disorderly conduct statute that relates to “Direct abusive or offensive language or gestures at another person” and included the limitation on police officers only in that offense. RCC § 22A-4001 does not clarify the limitation concerning police officers. It expands it.⁴

RCC § 22A-4002. Public Nuisance.

RCC § 22A-4002 provides that:

- (a) *Offense.* A person commits public nuisance when that person:
 - (1) Purposely engages in conduct that causes an unreasonable interruption of:
 - (A) a lawful public gathering;
 - (B) the orderly conduct of business in a public building;
 - (C) any person’s lawful use of a public conveyance; or

³ The proposal by “OAG/MPD/USAO” appeared in an attachment to a letter written to Mr. Silbert of the Council for Court Excellence. The topic heading of that section was “Abusive or offensive words – Proposed D.C. Official Code § 22-1321(a)(3)” and the recommended change only applied to that provision (which was the only provision that had a law enforcement carve out). See page 89 of the legislative history for the Disorderly Conduct Amendment Act of 2010. So, when the Council rejected our proposal, they were necessarily only talking about the proposed rewording of (a)(3) concerning law enforcement officers in the context of abusive or offensive words.

⁴ Given that the Council enacted D.C. Code § 22-1321 (a)(1), (2), and (3) at the same time and the Council only exempted law enforcement officers from (a)(3), it is unclear why the Commission is even delving into the legislative history to try and glean the Council’s intent. Even the Court of Appeals does not look to legislative history when the plain terms of the statute does not produce a result that is “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” *Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.*, 458 U.S. 564, 571(1982). “[I]n absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, [this Court is] not empowered to look beyond the plain meaning of a statute’s language in construing legislative intent.” *United States v. Stokes*, 365 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1976). The current disorderly conduct statute is not ambiguous on this point.

- (D) any person's quiet enjoyment of his or her residence between 10:00 pm and 7:00 am;
- (2) While that person is in a location that, in fact, is:
 - (A) Open to the general public; or
 - (B) A communal area of multi-unit housing.⁵

One of the ways to violate this statute would be to purposely engage in conduct that causes an unreasonable interruption of the orderly conduct of business in a public building. See paragraph (a)(1)(B). The term "public building" is defined as "a building that is occupied by the District of Columbia or federal government." See paragraph (c)(5). However, the term "occupied" is not defined. While it is clear that this offense applies to a person who disrupts the orderly conduct of public business, it is unclear which of the following locations are considered occupied by the government: a building that is owned by the public, where government offices are located, to any location where the public is invited and government business is held, or all of these locations. The focus of the prohibition, however, is in ensuring that public business can take place without undue interruption. It should not matter, therefore, where the location of the public business is held. In order to clarify and simplify this offense, we suggest that paragraph (B) be rewritten to say, "the orderly conduct of public business." The offense would then be to purposely engage in conduct that causes an unreasonable interruption of the orderly conduct of public business." The term "public business" could then be defined as "business conducted by the District of Columbia or federal government."

RCC § 22A-4002 (a)(1)(c) states that a person commits this offense when the person purposely engages in conduct that causes an unreasonable interruption of any person's lawful use of a public conveyance. It is unclear if this formulation is more narrow than current law. D.C. Code § 22-1321 (c) states, "It is unlawful for a person to engage in loud, threatening, or abusive language, or disruptive conduct with the intent and effect of impeding or disrupting the lawful use of a public conveyance by one or more other persons." [emphasis added] So, under current law a person may be guilty of this offense if they stand in front of the bus and refuse to let the

⁵ Paragraph (c) lists the definitions for words and terms used in this offense. It states:

- (1) The term "purposely," has the meaning specified in § 22A-206;
- (2) The term "bodily injury" has the meaning specified in § 22A-1001;
- (3) The term "property" has the meaning specified in § 22A-2001;
- (4) The term "lawful public gathering" includes any religious service, funeral, or similar organized proceeding;
- (5) The term "public building" means a building that is occupied by the District of Columbia or federal government;
- (6) The term "public conveyance" means any government-operated air, land, or water vehicle used for the transportation of persons, including but not limited to any airplane, train, bus, or boat; and
- (7) The phrase "open to the general public" excludes locations that require payment or permission to enter or leave at the time of the offense.

bus continue on its route. The person is clearly “disrupting the lawful use of a public conveyance.” But is that person “caus[ing] an unreasonable interruption of any person’s lawful use of a public conveyance”? While the bus may be stopped, is a person’s use of the conveyance interrupted? The Comment does not help to explain the drafter’s intent. In fact, it appears to limit the scope even further. That comment states “The accused must have the intent and effect of diverting a reasonable passenger’s pathway.”⁶ Nowhere in the current law or in the actual language of RCC § 22A-4002 (a)(1)(C) is this offense limited to pathways.

Another way to violate this statute would be to purposely engage in conduct that causes an unreasonable interruption of any person’s quiet enjoyment of his or her residence between 10:00 pm and 7:00 am. As the Comments note, this provision replaces D.C. Code § 22-1321(d). However, that provision is limited by paragraph (a) (2) which requires that the person be in a location that is, in fact, open to the general public or is a communal area of multi-unit housing when they engage in their conduct. See paragraph (a)(1)(D).⁷ There is no reason for this limitation. In D.C. Code § 22-1321, the requirement that the disorderly conduct occur in a place that is open to the general public or in the communal areas of multi-unit housing only applies to the offenses that are covered by the disorderly conduct provision in RCC § 22A-4001.⁸ There is no reason to extend this limitation to the parts of the disorderly conduct offense that is covered by the public nuisance provision of RCC § 22A-4001.⁹

⁶ See the last sentence on page 13 of the Report.

⁷ Paragraph (a)(1)(D) states, “While that person is in a location that, in fact is ... Open to the general public... or ... a communal area of multi-unit housing,” [emphasis added]. For purposes of this analysis, we assume that the “that person” refers to the person who commits the public nuisance and not the person referred to in the immediately preceding paragraphs (i.e. “(C) any person’s lawful use of a public conveyance; or (D) any person’s quiet enjoyment of his or her residence...”).

⁸ D.C. Code § 22-1321 (a) provides that:

In any place open to the general public, and in the communal areas of multi-unit housing, it is unlawful for a person to:

- (1) Intentionally or recklessly act in such a manner as to cause another person to be in reasonable fear that a person or property in a person’s immediate possession is likely to be harmed or taken;
- (2) Incite or provoke violence where there is a likelihood that such violence will ensue; or
- (3) Direct abusive or offensive language or gestures at another person (other than a law enforcement officer while acting in his or her official capacity) in a manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation or violence by that person or another person. [emphasis added]

⁹ As noted in the text, both the disorderly conduct and the public nuisance provisions contain the requirement the person be in a location that is open to the general public. However, the definitions of what “open to the general public” is different in these two offenses. Subparagraph (c)(4) of the disorderly conduct provision states “The phrase ‘open to the general public’ excludes locations that require payment or permission to enter or leave.” Subparagraph (c)(7) of

The possibility of arrest and prosecution under D.C. Code § 22-1321(d) has been an effective tool in quieting people who in their own house or apartment listen to their stereos, play musical instruments, or host parties that unreasonably annoy or disturb one or more other persons in their residences. In fact, D.C. Code § 22-1321(d) has been touted as the only effective tool used to combat noise that disrupts people's ability to enjoy their homes at night.¹⁰

There are other instances where the limitation of the location of the person who is engaging in the conduct that causes unreasonable interruptions, under (a)(2), is irrelevant. For example, "A person commits a public nuisance when that person [p]urposely engages in conduct that causes an unreasonable interruption of ... a lawful public gathering..." See (a)(1)(A). Paragraph (c) (4) defines a "lawful public gathering as "any religious service, funeral or similar organized proceeding." It does not matter whether a person who wants to disrupt a funeral service is standing on a corner that is open to the public or is standing on the roof of a private building across the street when they use a megaphone to unreasonable interrupt the public gathering.

The revised public nuisance statute also eliminates urinating and defecating in a public place as a disturbance of the public peace offense. D.C. Code § 22-1321(e). OAG supports decriminalization. However, while public urination and defecation would be better handled as a civil infraction punishable by a civil summons and a fine, the District should seek to develop a robust civil infraction enforcement system.

the public nuisance provision, on the other hand, states, "the phrase 'open to the general public' excludes locations that require payment or permission to enter or leave at the time of the offense." [emphasis added] It is unclear whether the difference was intentional and if it was why these two related offenses would vary on a basic element.

A separate issue with the definitions of "open to the general public" cited above, is that the phrase only gives a slice of a definition, by identifying a specific thing that's excluded from the definition ("excludes locations that require payment..."). Ordinarily, a definition should be exhaustive, covering the realm of what the term includes as well as excludes.

¹⁰ The Criminal Code Reform Commission may want to listen to the hearing on Bill 22-839, the "Amplified Noise Amendment Act of 2018" which was held on July 2, 2018. Although the hearing was focused on why the noise regulations contained in the DCMR are inadequate to address various noise problems, Councilmembers and witnesses were in near agreement that D.C. Code § 22-1321 (d), as written, was the only effective tool in addressing noise issues.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia

Public Safety Division



MEMORANDUM

TO: Richard Schmechel
Executive Director
D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission

FROM: Dave Rosenthal
Senior Assistant Attorney General

DATE: September 14, 2018

SUBJECT: First Draft of Report #24, Failure to Disperse and Rioting

The Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia (OAG) and the other members of the Code Revision Advisory Group of the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission (CCRC) were asked to review the First Draft of Report #24 - Failure to Disperse and Rioting.¹

COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

RCC § 22A-4102. Failure to Disperse.

The elements portion of the failure to disperse provision is as follows:

- (a) *Offense.* A person commits failure to disperse when that person:
 - (1) In fact:
 - (A) Is in the immediate vicinity a course of disorderly conduct, as defined in § 22A-4001, being committed by five or more persons;
 - (B) The course of disorderly conduct is likely to cause substantial harm to persons or property; and
 - (C) The person's continued presence substantially impairs the ability of a law enforcement officer to stop the course of disorderly conduct; and
 - (2) The person knowingly fails to obey a law enforcement officer's dispersal order;

¹ This review was conducted under the understanding that the structure of the code revision process allows the members of the Code Revision Advisory Group an opportunity to provide meaningful input without limiting the position that the members may take at any subsequent hearing that the Council may have on any legislation that may result from the Report.

(3) When the person could safely have done so.

One way that this offense can be committed is when a person “[is] in the immediate vicinity [of]² a course of disorderly conduct...being committed by five or more persons...” See (a)(1)(A) above. On page 4, footnote 3, it states that the phrase “immediate vicinity,” “as in the disorderly conduct statute, . . . refers to the area near enough for the accused to see or hear others’ activities.”³ If this footnote is meant to articulate a specific definition for “immediate vicinity,” that definition should be in the text (as it should be in the rioting statute).⁴

As noted above, one element of this offense may be “[t]he person’s continued presence substantially impairs the ability of a law enforcement officer to stop the course of disorderly conduct...” [emphasis added] The Commentary notes, on page 4, that “Substantial impairment is more than trivial difficulty.” There is a footnote to that statement that reads, “For example, the need for a law enforcement officer to walk around a peaceable demonstrator in order to reach the place where the group disorderly conduct is occurring would not alone amount to substantial impairment.” The problem is that the word “substantial” is not defined in the proposal. It is a long way from “more than trivial difficulty” to “substantial.” If the Commentary correctly captures the level of police impairment, then either the word “substantial” should be defined as “nontrivial” or the phrase in the Commentary should be substituted in the text of the offense.

Pursuant to paragraph (d), the “Attorney General for the District of Columbia shall prosecute violations of this section.” We agree with this designation but would like to avoid needless litigation concerning the Council’s authority to give prosecutorial authority to OAG. The penalty provision for the failure to disperse offense states, “Failure to disperse is a Class [X] crime subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of [X], a maximum fine of [X], or both.” To avoid needless litigation over the history of this provision, whether it is a police regulation or a penal statute in the nature of police or municipal regulations, and its interplay with D.C. Code § 23-101, OAG recommends that the penalty provision be redrafted to state, “Failure to disperse is a Class [X] crime subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of [X] or a maximum fine of [X].”

In the Explanatory Note, and elsewhere in the Commentary it states, “The offense codifies in the D.C. Code longstanding authority exercised under DCMR 18-2000.2 (Failure to obey a lawful

² The text of paragraph (a)(1)(A) states, “Is in the immediate vicinity a course of disorderly conduct ...” This may be a typo. We assume that it was supposed to read, “Is in the immediate vicinity of a course of disorderly conduct ...”

³ The footnote should reference the rioting statute (RCC § 22A-4102(a)(2)), not the disorderly conduct statute (which doesn’t use the phrase).

⁴ The term “immediate vicinity”, as noted in the text, is used in, but not defined in the redrafted rioting offense. Footnote 26 in the Commentary does state, “The term “immediate vicinity” in the revised rioting statute refers to the area near enough for the accused to see or hear others’ activities” and then says, “. See *United States v. Matthews*, 419 F.2d 1177, 1185 (1969).” The Commission should include a definition in both the failure to disperse and rioting offenses based upon this footnote.

police order) in the context of group disorderly conduct.”⁵ It must be noted, that the regulation that this offence is codifying only relates to vehicular or pedestrian traffic. As the elements of the offense does not include reference to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, it appears to be broader in scope than the provision that it purports to be replacing. To the extent that it does not subsume the existing regulation, the explanation should be expanded and affirmatively state that the enactment of this provision is not intended to repeal that regulation. Examples of offenses covered by the existing regulation include when officers tells a woman who is double parked to move her vehicle and she does not, asks a man to partially roll down his window so that the officer can test for a tint infraction and he does not, or when an officer sees a woman lift the security tape labeled “POLICE LINE DO NOT CROSS” and she refuses to leave the area when told to do so by a police officer.

In the explanation of subsection (a)(1)(C) in the Commentary, it states, “The actor’s engagement in conduct that is protected by the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, or District law is not a defense to failure to disperse because such rights are outweighed by the need for law enforcement to effectively address group disorderly conduct.”⁶ While OAG agrees with this statement, at least as far as it speaks of the First Amendment and District law, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, as such, it is not apparent why it is referenced here.

RCC § 22A-4101. Rioting.⁷

⁵ The regulation states, “No person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, police cadet, or civilian crossing guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. This section shall apply to pedestrians and to the operators of vehicles.”

⁶ The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

⁷ The offense portion of RCC § 22A-4101, rioting, is as follows:

- (a) A person commits rioting when that person:
 - (1) Commits disorderly conduct as defined in § 22A-4001;
 - (2) Reckless as to the fact that four or more other persons in the immediate vicinity are simultaneously engaged in disorderly conduct;
 - (3) And the conduct is committed:
 - (A) With intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a crime involving:
 - (i) Bodily injury to another person;
 - (ii) Damage to property of another; or
 - (iii) The taking of property of another;
 - (B) While knowingly possessing a dangerous weapon; or

Paragraph (a) states that a person commits rioting when a person “(1) Commits disorderly conduct ... (2) Reckless as to the fact that four or more other persons in the immediate vicinity are simultaneously engaged in disorderly conduct ... (3) And the conduct is committed . . .” [emphasis added] We read this sentence to mean that “the conduct” in subparagraph (a)(3) refers to the person’s conduct in (a)(1) and not the group conduct in (a)(2) notwithstanding that the reference to “group conduct” appears between these two iterations. To clarify this point we recommend that subparagraph (3) be redrafted to read “And the person’s conduct is committed...”

One way that this offense can be committed is when a person commits disorderly conduct, reckless as to the fact that four or more other persons in the immediate vicinity are simultaneously engaged in disorderly conduct and the conduct is committed with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a crime involving bodily injury to another person. [emphasis added] See (a)(3)(A)(i). As to the offense “involving bodily injury to another person”, the question arises whether this other person must be someone other than the person who is committing the disorderly conduct, the four or more other persons who are also committing disorderly conduct, or both. We agree that the offense of rioting should not include situations where the person who is committing disorderly conduct, with others, hurts himself. We want to be clear, in addition, that the text was not meant to exclude situations where a person intends to commit a crime involving bodily injury to someone else who is also being disorderly. We note that the Comment would not require such a reading.⁸ Take for example the situation where there is meeting of international finance ministers in the District and protests and counter-protests occur. These protestors represent different and contradictory perspectives on the direction of world finance, just as the counter-protestors do. A subset of the protestors, say anarchists become disorderly, a different subset, say a group supporting funding a repressive country’s regime, also becomes disorderly, and a group of the anarchists decide to injure a few of the regime protestors. There is no reason why the offense of rioting should not apply to these anarchists.

(C) While knowing any participant in the disorderly conduct is using or plans to use a dangerous weapon.

⁸ See Comment on page 10 that “‘Another person’ means any person who is not a participant in the rioting.” So, another person may include a person who is disorderly, but not rioting.